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	RESPONSE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL, TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION¹

On June 14, 2007, Fine, as attorney for Marina Strand Colony II
Homeowners Association (hereafter "Marina Strand"), filed a petition for writ of
mandate in the matter of *Marina Strand Colony II, Homeowners Association, Petitioner, v. County of Los Angeles, Respondent, Del Rey Shores Joint Venture; Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North, Real Parties in Interest* (hereafter "Real
Parties in Interest"), Superior Court of California, County of Los Angles, Case No.
BS109420.² The Marina Strand state action was thereafter assigned to the Writs
and Receivers Department, the Hon. David P. Yaffe ("Judge Yaffe"), Judge of the
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, pursuant to Superior Court
of California, County of Los Angeles, Local Rule 2.5(j).³

On September 13, 2007, and after Fine had failed to timely request a hearing, Real Parties in Interest, Marina Strand, filed a motion to dismiss the Marina Strand litigation pursuant to *California Public Resources Code* section 21167.4.⁴

¹ Real Parties in Interest will, or have, filed a response containing a lengthy and detailed procedural history which is incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth. For purposes of clarity, an abbreviated factual summary is presented herein.

² See Exhibit "A," Judgment and Order of Contempt Re Richard I. Fine, Findings of Fact, page 5, para. 1.

³ The procedural history provided herein relates to the actions in the Superior Court and subsequent appeals in state court. The only federal matter pending in regards to the Marina Strand litigation is the pending habeas corpus petition before this court.

⁴ *Id.*, para. 2. Section 21167.4 provides that in actions, such as the Marina Strand litigation, "the petitioner shall request a hearing within 90 days from the date of filing the petition or shall be subject to dismissal on the court's own motion or on

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On October 17, 2007, in an unrelated administrative proceeding, the California State Bar Court issued an order recommending the disbarment of Fine, and involuntarily enrolled him as an inactive member of the State Bar as of that date.⁵ Ultimately, Fine's Disbarment became final on March 13, 2009.⁶

Notwithstanding the foregoing administrative ruling by the State Bar Court, on October 15, 2007, Fine (as the attorney for Marina Strand) filed a motion for relief from the dismissal pursuant to *California Code of Civil Procedure*, section 473, based upon his personal affidavit of attorney fault. Thereafter, the motion to dismiss and the motion for relief from dismissal were continued to January 8, 2008, to permit the petitioners to retain new counsel due to the administrative action of the State Bar Court regarding Fine. 8

The court granted the motion for relief, but ordered Fine, the attorney at fault, to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties pursuant to *California Code of Civil Procedure*, section 473(b).⁹

On February 19, 2008, before the final determination of the amount of the compensatory legal fees and costs to be awarded pursuant to section 473, Fine filed what was described by Judge Yaffe as "a confusing" pleading purporting to

the motion of any party interested in the action or proceeding."

⁵ See Exhibit "A," Judgment and Order of Contempt Re Richard I. Fine, Findings of Fact, page 5, para 4.

⁶ See Exhibit "C," California State Bar website printout re Richard I. Fine.

⁷ See Exhibit "B," Order Striking Notice of Disqualification, the Marina Strand state action, page 1, lines 15-19.

⁸ See Exhibit "A," Judgment and Order of Contempt Re Richard I. Fine, Findings of Fact, page 5, para 4.

⁹ See Exhibit "B," Order Striking Notice of Disqualification, page 1, lines 19 to 22.

seek disqualification and seeking dismissal of the ordered sanctions and attorney's fees.¹⁰

On March 18, 2008, Judge Yaffe found that the purported disqualification in an affidavit in the body of another motion was insufficient to put the court on notice of a statement of disqualification for cause, that such a statement must be filed by a party or an attorney for a party (which Fine was not); and, as specifically authorized by *California Code of Civil Procedure*, section 170.4(b), struck the pleading as untimely and as failing to demonstrate, on its face, a legal ground for disqualification. Fine was admonished that the disqualification determination was not an appealable order, and that *California Code of Civil Procedure*, section 170.3(d) provided that the exclusive means of reviewing the determination was a timely filed petition for a writ of mandate. Fine failed to timely file a writ and, as a result, the determination became final and not subject to

¹⁰ The pleading is entitled "NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY LA SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES RECEIVING MONEY FROM LA COUNTY, DISMISS ORDER TO PAY SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER FORMER COUNSEL OF MARINA STRAND COLONY II HOA, LACK OF NOTICE OF IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS, LEGAL FEES AND COSTS AND THAT HE DISCRETIONARY PROVISION OF CCP §473(B) DOES NOT ALLOW OR MANDATE THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS, LEGAL FEES AND COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; AND DECLARATION OF RICHARD I. FINE."

¹¹ See Exhibit "B," Order Striking Notice of Disqualification, page 2, line14 to page 3, line 4.

¹² *Id.*, page 2, line 26 to page 3, line 4. The California Supreme Court has held that both the determination of a *California Code of Civil Procedure*, section 170.3 statement of disqualification for cause and a *Code of Civil Procedure*, section 170.6 peremptory challenge are governed by *Code of Civil Procedure*, section 170.3, subdivision (d), which provides that a petition for writ of mandate is the exclusive means of appellate review of those determinations. *People v. Hull* (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272-273.

further review.¹³

On April 15, 2008, The Superior Court made an order awarding the Real Parties in Interest the sum of \$46,329.01 in compensatory attorneys fees and costs against Fine. On May 27, 2008, Fine was served with an Order Requiring Appearance (ORAP) to appear on June 18, 2008, before Superior Court Commissioner Murray Gross for a judgment debtor examination. Fine was also served with a Subpoena Duces Tecum requiring him to produce various documents at the judgment debtor examination.

On June 18, 2008, Fine filed objections to both the examination and the subpoena; Commissioner Gross overruled all of Fine's objections and ordered the judgment debtor examination to proceed and for Fine to produce the documents called for in the subpoena. Fine was sworn, but he refused to answer any questions other than stating his name, that he had been served with the Order to Appear and the subpoena, that he would not produce any of the subpoenaed documents in response to the subpoena, and that he had not obtained a stay of execution of the April 15, 2008, Order either from the Superior Court or from an appellate court. To

Commissioner Gross determined the questions that Fine refused to answer were proper, again overruled Fines objections, and ordered Fine to answer the questions and produce the subpoenaed documents. Fine continued to object and

¹³ *Id*.

¹⁴ See Exhibit "A," Judgment and Order of Contempt Re Richard I. Fine, Findings of Fact, page 6, para. 11

¹⁵ *Id.*, page 6, para. 12.

¹⁶ *Id.*, page 6, para. 15.

¹⁷ *Id.*, page 6, para. 16.

refused to answer any questions. Commissioner Gross found that he had the authority to rule on the objections and ordered the examination to go forward. Fine was ordered to return on August 25, 2008 for the completion of the judgment debtor examination.¹⁸

On August 25, 2008, Fine appeared, but again refused to answer any questions or produce any of the subpoenaed documents and refused to comply with Commissioner Gross' orders to answer the questions and produce documents pursuant to the subpoena. Commissioner Gross continued the judgment debtor examination to December 29, 2008.¹⁹

On December 29, 2008, Fine again refused to answer any questions, produce any of the subpoenaed documents or comply with Commissioner Gross' further orders to answer the questions and produce the subpoenaed documents. Fine continued his refusals and Commissioner Gross continued the hearing to March 16, 2009.²⁰

Counsel for Real Parties in Interest in the Marina Strand state action filed an application for an Order to Show Cause re Contempt (OSC), pursuant to *California Code of Civil Procedure*, section 1211, which was granted.²¹ The OSC set forth 16 specific charges of contempt, which were grouped into five categories for the purposes of trial.²²

²² *Id.*, page 4, para. 5. The charges are listed as follows: Charge 1: Failing to answer questions and produce documents at the Judgment Debtor Examination despite valid service of a subpoena and being lawfully ordered to do so by

¹⁸ *Id.*, page 6, para. 17.

¹⁹ *Id.*, page 7, para. 18.

²⁰ *Id.*, page 7, para. 20.

Trial of the contempt proceeding was held on December 22, 24, 26, and 30, 2008, and on January 8, 12, and 22, 2009. Fine was advised of his right to counsel, which he waived; and of his right against self incrimination, which he asserted.²³

Following the trial the court found Fine not guilty with respect to charges 2, 3, and 5, relating to attacking the integrity of the court and the State Bar, making repeated motions for reconsideration, and lying about his status with the State Bar.²⁴ Since Fine was not found guilty of these charges, these charges did not form the basis for any penalty or confinement and are not pertinent to the present petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Judge Yaffe found Fine guilty of charges 1 and 4: willful disobedience of Commissioner Gross' June 18, 2008, August 25, 2008, October 15, 2008, and December 29, 2008, orders to answer questions and produce documents at the Judgment Debtor examination; and that Fine unlawfully practiced law and held himself out as entitled to practice law.²⁵

No confinement was imposed for unlawfully practicing law or holding himself out as entitled to practice law, and accordingly, that issue is not pertinent to this present petition for writ of habeas corpus.

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Commissioner Gross; Charge 2: Attacking the integrity of the court in general and the State Bar; Charge 3: Making repeated motions for reconsideration in violation of *California Code of Civil Procedure*, section 1008; Charge 4: Practicing law, and/or holding himself out as entitled to practice law in the State of California when he was not entitled to practice law in the State of California; and Charge 5: Lying about his status with the State Bar in pleadings filed in court and in oral arguments before the court.

²³ *Id.*, page 4, paras. 7 & 8.

²⁴ *Id.*, page 12, paras. 2, 3, and 5.

 $^{^{25}}$ Id., pages 11 to 12, paras. 1 and 4.

The only confinement ordered was coercive civil contempt intended to compel Fine to comply with his mandatory obligation to answer the lawful questions and provide documents concerning his assets at the time of the judgment debtor examination. No penal confinement was imposed, and no issue concerning criminal contempt is presented by these proceedings.

Before imposing the coercive confinement, and at the hearing on March 4, 2009, the Judge Yaffe inquired of Fine if he had any intention of answering the questions. Fine responded as follows:

"I am exercising my rights of petition for habeas corpus. At such times, those rights are entirely finished. If, in fact, I lose with those writs, then I would answer the questions." (Emphasis added.)

Pursuant to *California Code of Civil Procedure*, section 1219(a), the Superior Court ordered Fine incarcerated in the Los Angeles County Jail until he provides all the information concerning his assets as ordered by Commissioner Gross.²⁷ Judge Yaffe also detailed the manner by which Mr. Fine may end his confinement as follows:

- Mr. Fine may at any time file with the court a declaration stating that
 he is willing to answer the questions put to him in the Judgment
 Debtor examination which he was ordered to answer by
 Commissioner Gross;
- Upon receipt of that declaration the court will set a date and time for the resumption of the Judgment Debtor Proceeding and authorizing the Sheriff to transport Fine to the proceeding; and
- if Fine answers the questions concerning his assets that he has been

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²⁶ See Exhibit "D," March 4, 2009, Reporter's Transcript, pages 8-10.

²⁷ *Id*, pages 14-15.

ordered to answer, the court will authorize the Sheriff to release him from custody.²⁸

Fine holds the key to his jail cell. By simply agreeing to answer the questions and produce documents concerning his assets, that he has a legal obligation to provide, his coercive confinement will end.

II. THE USE OF COERCIVE CONFINEMENT IS AN APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL DEVICE FOR COMPELLING COMPLIANCE WITH VALID COURT ORDERS

The use of coercive confinement resulting from a civil contempt has been approved and found appropriate by the United States Supreme Court, federal district and appellate courts and California state courts, regarding the right of a civil judgment creditor to pursue and of a trial court to impose for purposes of an individual's compliance with a valid court order. As stated in 7 Witkin, *California Procedure* (5th Ed. 2008), §173, Civil Contempt:

"When a valid court order for the benefit of a successful party in a civil action, e.g., an injunction or support decree, is disobeyed by the adverse party, the latter commits a civil contempt. This type of contempt is essentially a remedy of a party to enforce certain kinds of judgments or orders. (See McCrone v. United States (1939) 307 U.S. 61, 59 S.Ct. 685, 686, 83 L.Ed. 1108, 1110 ['a contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public']; Penfield Co. of Calif. v. Securities & Exchange Com. (1947) 330 U.S. 585, 67 S.Ct. 918, 921, 91 L.Ed. 1117, 1123; McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co. (1949) 336 U.S. 187,

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²⁸ *Id.*, page 15.

69 S.Ct. 497, 499, 93 L.Ed. 599, 604; International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell (1994) 512 U.S. 821, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2557, 129 L.Ed.2d 642, 651, infra, §187; In re Morris (1924) 194 C. 63, 67, 227 P. 914 [quoting United States Supreme Court decision; civil contempt proceedings are 'remedial and coercive in their nature, and the parties chiefly in interest in their conduct and prosecution are the individuals whose private rights and remedies they were instituted to protect or enforce']; People v. Derner (1986) 182 C.A.3d 588, 592, 227 C.R. 344, citing the text [contempt judgment for failure to return child as required by custody order was civil rather than criminal contempt because it appeared from judge's statement that 'primary part of his purpose was coercive," i.e., to dissuade defendant from further violations]; Mulvany v. Superior Court (1986) 184 C.A.3d 906, 908."

In this matter, the purpose of the finding of contempt, and the resulting confinement, was coercive in nature, as the purpose is to compel Fine to answer the questions and produce documents concerning his ability to satisfy the order awarding attorney's fees and costs to the Real Parties in Interest. Nothing more, nothing less.

III. FINE ADMITS THAT THE NATURE AND INDETERMINATE LENGTH OF HIS CONFINEMENT WILL NOT AFFECT HIS DECISION TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR EXAMINATION

While the duration of a coercive civil contempt confinement might potentially be raised as an issue, it is not an issue here. Fine has already admitted that in the event his attempt to obtain habeas relief fails, he will answer the questions regarding his financial condition, thereby conceding that the coercive

and indeterminate nature of his confinement is the not the yardstick by which he will, or will not, answer those questions. Again, at the March 4, 2009 hearing, Fine stated "[i]f in fact, I lose those [habeas] writs, then I would answer the questions." Thus, Fine has conceded that his confinement is coercive in nature, not penal.

As a result, the "presence ... of a substantial likelihood that ... continued confinement" will accomplish the purpose of the order ..." becomes the focus of the court's inquiry, and test on habeas review. *In re Farr* (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 577, 584, 111 Cal.Rptr. 649.

A reviewing court should normally be reluctant to conclude that as a matter of due process, confinement of an individual based upon a finding of civil contempt has lost its coercive impact. The determination as to whether a civil contempt sanction has lost its coercive effect upon a particular contemnor rests within the sound discretion of the district court. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Elmas Trading Corporation, 824 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.1987). See also In re Grand Jury, 851 F.2d 499, 502 (1st Cir.1988); Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34,d 37 (2d Cir.1983); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 427 (3d Cir.1979) (holding that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, a reviewing court should be reluctant to conclude, as a matter of due process, that a civil contempt sanction has lost its coercive impact at some point prior to the eighteen-month period prescribed as a maximum by 28 U.S.C. § 1826).

As stated, Fine has conceded that should his attempt to obtain habeas relief fail, he will answer the questions regarding his financial condition. As such, the confinement is coercive in nature and for the sole purpose of compelling Fine to comply with the Superior Court's order to answer questions at a judgment debtor

²⁹ *Id.* at page 9, lines 4-5.

examination.

CONCLUSION IV.

Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that Fine's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ex parte application for immediate release must be denied.

Dated: May / = , 2009

BENTON, ORR, DUVAL & BUCKINGHAM

Attorneys for Respondents, Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles and the Hon. David P Yaffe, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles

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PROOF OF SERVICE Fine v. Sheriff of Los Angeles County Case No.: CV09-1914-JFW (CW)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF VENTURA

I am employed in the County of Ventura, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 39 N. California Street, Ventura, CA 93001.

On May 1, 2009, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: **RESPONSE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,** *ET AL***, TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; ETC.**; **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT** on the interested parties in this action by placing an original <u>XXX</u> a copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

Richard I. Fine, BK # 1824367
Twin Towers Correctional Facility
450 Bauchet Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012

12 Aaron M. Fontana, Esq. Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi PC 100 West Broadway Suite 1200 Glendale, CA 91210

Frederick Bennett, Esq.
Court Counsel, Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles
111 N. Hill Street, Room 546
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Joshua L. Rosen, Esq.
Law Offices of Joshua L. Rosen
5905 Sherbourne Drive
Los Angeles, CA 90056

21 XXX BY FIRST CLASS MAIL) (BY EXPRESS MAIL) I caused such envelope with postage thereon fully prepared to be placed in the United States mail at Ventura, California. I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

XXX (Federal) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May 1, 2009, at Ventura, California

Jacqueline D. Mora

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