	AUG 8201 D. CALLISON
Бу	DEPOTY CLERK

SUPERIOR COURT STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SOLANO

L	DEPART	MENTONE
MILDRED MCCAULEY,		NO. FCS041881
Plaintiff, vs.		RULING REGARDING MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,		Hearing Date: July 9, 2014
Defendants.	/	

Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses to requests for production and special interrogatories came on regularly for hearing on July 9, 2014 before the Honorable Paul L. Beeman. Elizabeth S. Letcher, Esq. and Robert David Humphreys, Esq., appeared as counsel for Plaintiff. David S. Reidy, Esq., and Aaron R. Marienthal, Esq., appeared as counsel for defendants. The Court issued its tentative ruling on July 8, 2014, to which timely argument was requested. The Court heard the statements and arguments of counsel. Thereafter, the matter was submitted for decision. Now, therefore, based on the pleadings and records on file and the statements and arguments of the parties, the Court enters the following ruling. //

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Insofar as this motion sought to compel a further response to Special Interrogatory 17: it is denied.

C.C.P. section 2030.300(c) requires a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories be filed within 45 days of service of the response or supplemental response, "or any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing", or the right has been waived. [A similar provision applies to requests for production of documents, at C.C.P. section 2031.310(c)].

All of the discovery at issue in this motion was served in October 2013, and initial responses served in mid-November.

On March 17, 2014, counsel for BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. ("BA") proposed to extend to April 28 the deadline for each side to move to compel further responses, BA as to all discovery it had served on Plaintiff, and Plaintiff as to 2 sets of requests for production of documents (including the set including requests 18-20). However, in that letter, BA asserted that it had provided full and complete responses and/or supplemental responses to all other discovery requests, and stated its belief that "we are not aware of any outstanding issues as to those requests which would require additional time to sort out".

By letter dated March 20, 2014, Plaintiff's counsel agreed "to make the omnibus motion to compel further discovery responses April 28, 2014". She disagreed with BA's claim that there were no outstanding issues as to those [other] requests", and asserted that the "question of documents and witnesses related to the accounting revisions on a group of 113 loans remains outstanding", and asked whether BA intended to supplement [its] responses". However, she did not specifically refer to special interrogatories. Other than the use of the word "omnibus", her letter did not suggest that the deadline for compelling further responses to special interrogatories should also be part of the extension proposed by BA's counsel. Further, nothing in her

responsive letter suggested that she was confirming an agreement made by counsel for BA to extend the deadline applicable for moving to compel a further response to special interrogatory 17.

This motion to compel further responses was not filed until April 28, well past the deadline that would have applied absent an agreement to extend.

The extension agreement identified above clearly applied to the requests for production at issue in this motion, and this motion is therefore timely as to them.

The 3 requests for production at issue in this motion concern all documents regarding the Forbearance Project and interrelated processes (the "TRNS FNMA Remediation Reverse/Reprocess Project" and the "Mass Mod Completion" and "Non MHA FNMA 02/20/2013 (113 Loans- Reprocess)".

There is no dispute that BA has produced, over time, responsive documents to these requests, and some even after this motion was filed. However, BA has not produced information about the 112 other borrowers subject to the Forbearance Project, other than heavily redacted spreadsheets that in this redacted form fail to identify any of these other borrowers. (Neither side has produced any of these documents to the court, which therefore must rely upon the characterizations of those documents as thus far provided by the parties).

The dispute here is over whether Plaintiff is entitled to information about these other borrowers and their loan modifications and treatment under the Forbearance Project. Specifically, Plaintiff by time of hearing clarified she sought the account servicing telephone notes for the 112 other borrowers nationwide (32 of whom had California residences), so that Plaintiff could review those notes and identify which recorded versions of those calls could concern the Forbearance Project, so that she could request and obtain from BA after appropriate notice to those specific other borrowers the recorded versions of those calls (if they were recorded and retained by BA).

The threshold issue for discovery is whether the documents contain information that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. C.C.P. section 2017.010.

Plaintiff's first amended complaint alleges the right to both statutory and punitive damages, based upon California law.

Civil Code section 3294 authorizes recovery of punitive damages for fraudulent, malicious or oppressive conduct.

Malice can include the willful and conscious disregard of the rights of others.

Civil Code section 3294(c)(1); <u>Taylor v. Superior Court</u> (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-895.

The plaintiff must prove either that the wrongful act was knowingly committed or was engaged in with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.

Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 791-792 [holding plaintiff was entitled to send letter to 35 other claimants whose claims were handled by the same insurance adjuster, requesting that they consent to the release of their records from the adjuster's office]; Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 329 [existence of established policies or practices in claims handling which are harmful to insureds could help establish punitive damages].

The existence of conduct which "risks harm to many" may justify a higher award of punitive damages than conduct which could affect only that particular plaintiff.

Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 549 U.S. 346, 357. However, such evidence is considered only as to the reprehensibility of that conduct, not for the purpose of punishing the defendant directly for harm caused to others. Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 695 n.23.

To be admissible and relevant to the reprehensibility assessment, the conduct of the defendant towards third parties must be similar to the tortious conduct that injured the plaintiff(s). <u>Johnson v. Ford Motor Company</u> (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191, 1204; <u>Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co.</u> (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1054

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n.34 [jury can consider evidence of conduct similar or bearing a relationship to that which injured the plaintiff].

A state court cannot impose punitive damages based upon conduct to others outside of the state. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 421 [holding that bad faith claims involving insureds outside of the state of Utah were not properly considered in the reprehensibility analysis, as "A state generally has no legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the state's jurisdiction"].

Still, complaints from outside California reported to a business conducting an unlawful policy affecting persons both within and outside of California may be relevant to determining whether that business continued to employ and failed to correct that policy, so as to demonstrate conscious disregard for the rights of California consumers.

[L]awful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortious Id. at 422.

The court, therefore, determines that the account servicing telephone notes for all 112 other borrowers, including the majority of whom did not involve California residences, are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence.

Plaintiff's counsel at hearing and in post-trial letter brief conceded that the account servicing telephone notes should be redacted so that all identifying information is removed before produced to Plaintiff.

The redaction of this identifying information eliminates the need for prior notice to those 112 other borrowers that their (redacted) records will be produced to Plaintiff. Snibbe v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 184.

In <u>Snibbe</u>, the patient who had undergone hip replacement surgery died, with some evidence to suggest that a pain medication was prescribed in a dosage too heavy for the circumstances. The orthopedic surgeon defendant was ordered to produce the pain management part of 160 post-op orders issued by him or by his physician's assistant, redacted for identification information about the patients subject to those orders. The court held that no balancing of privacy rights or prior notice to these other patients was required.

BA is, therefore, ordered to produce, within 20 days, all account servicing telephone notes for these 112 other borrowers, for the entire time period from the first implementation of the Forbearance Project, until the time when BA corrected Plaintiff's account to confirm that she remained current on her monthly payments, redacted only as to the identification information for those 112 other borrowers.

To the extent Plaintiff later requests specific recordings based upon Plaintiff's review of those account servicing telephone notes, the privacy rights of those other borrowers heard and/or referenced in those recordings are triggered.

The court has conducted a balancing test, to determine if the need for information about those borrowers and their treatment by BA under the Forbearance project outweighs their right to privacy. The court has sought to limit the intrusion to the minimum intrusion necessary to achieve the objective of providing Plaintiff sufficient information to determine if those particular borrowers were subjected to the same type of miscalculation of charges alleged in Plaintiff's action against BA, and to provide these other borrowers a reasonable opportunity to object or consent to the disclosure.

One recent California Supreme Court case held that an "opt out" type of notice adequately protected the privacy rights of complaining consumers. <u>Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007)</u> 40 Cal.4th 360.

The court, therefore, orders that prior to the production of any of the account servicing telephone recordings, or any other identifying information concerning any of the 112 other borrowers subject to the Forbearance Project, that they be provided an "opt out" notice, requiring them to affirmatively object to the release of this information to Plaintiff's counsel by written objection postmarked within a stated reasonable period of time after receiving such notice (such as 30 days) or it will be released.

In order to maximize the possibility that the other borrowers sent this notice actually receive it, and read and consider it, the court directs it be sent by a third party administrator, via overnight mail. BA shall provide the third party administrator the last known address in its records for each such other borrower whose recordings or other identifying information is sought by Plaintiff. The third party administrator shall then employ any methods ordinarily used to confirm and/or locate current addresses for any of these other borrowers, before sending this notice, and will report to both sides any inquiries by these other borrowers. Both sides will split the costs of the third party administrator, paying an advance deposit in the expected amount for such services.

As neither side has yet provided the court with a proposed notice that incorporates all of these terms, nor has either side nominated a third party administrator, the court directs them to meet and confer, and present a joint proposal for the notice for the court to approve. In the event that the parties cannot agree on any of these matters, each is to submit to the court within 15 days their proposed notice and nomination for third party administrator.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge of the Superior Court

1	SOLANO COUNTY COURTS				
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA Hall of Justice, 600 Union Avenue, Fairfield, CA				
3	CERTIFICATE AND AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING	<u>G</u> NO. FCS041881			
4	L Donna Callison, certify under penal	ty of perjury that I am a Judicial Assistant			
5	of the above-entitled Court and not a party to the within action; that I served the attached by causing to be placed a true copy thereof in an envelope which was their				
6	sealed and postage fully prepaid on the date shown below; that I am readily familia				
7	I with the Officed States Postal Service, that this document was deposited in the Office				
8	States Postal Service on the date indicated. Said envelopes were addressed to the attorneys/parties and any other interested party as indicated below.				
9	Document Served: Ruling Regarding Motion to Compel Further Responses				
10	Elizabeth S.Letcher, Esq.	Robert David Humphreys, Esq.			
11	HOUSING & ECONOMIC RIGHTS ADVOCATES	HUMPHREYS WALLACE HUMPHREYS			
12	1814 Franklin Street, Suite 1040 Oakland, CA 94612	9202 S. Toledo Avenue Tulsa, OK 74137			
13	David S. Reidy, Esq.				
14	Aaron R. Marienthal, Esq.				
15	101 Second Street, Suite 1800 San Francisco, CA 94105-3659				
16	Gair Fancisco, CA 94103-3039				
17					
18	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on August, 2014 at Fairfield, California.				
19	This decidration was executed on August, 2014 at 1 aimeid, Gainornia.				
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21	Donna Callison				
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25					
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